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RECENT DECISIONS
AMENDMENT OF RULE I, RULES OF THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT: THE
PROBLEM OF DETERMINING UNSETTLED QUESTIONS OF MONTANA LAW IN
FEDERAL COURT. In a state court action, plaintiff recovered a judgment
against an insured tortfeasor for wrongful death. In a subsequent federal
district court action based on diversity of citizenship, plaintiff (to whom
the insured had assigned all of his insurance rights) sought to recover from
Mid-Century Insurance Company the amount of the judgment. The federal
district court, after briefly summarizing an agreed statement of facts, set
forth several decisive questions of Montana statutory law which were
undecided by the Supreme Court of Montana.' The federal court judge,
acting pursuant to the recently adopted Rule 1 of the Montana Supreme
Court,2 certified that the questions of Montana law were controlling in the
federal litigation, that the adjudication of them by the Montana Supreme
Court would materially advance ultimate termination of the federal liti-
gation, and ordered the plaintiff to commence a declaratory judgment
action in the Montana Supreme Court. Further proceedings in the federal
court action were stayed, pending either a determination of the questions
by the Montana Supreme Court or a refusal by that court to entertain juris-
diction. Lewis v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 24 St. Rep. 859 (1967).
The recently adopted Supreme Court Rule and its first application
in the Lewis case, undoubtedly raised a few eyebrows and a number of
questions among Montana attorneys. This article will explore the nature
of that rule and possible difficulties with its constitutionality and utiliza-
tion.
In Montana, with its relatively low volume of litigation, there is
often substantial ground for difference of opinion as to the status of Mon-
tana law in a specific area. Federal courts are frequently called upon to
adjudicate questions of Montana law. In federal actions based on diversity
of citizenship, for example, questions of state law almost always arise.3
Questions of Montana law might be involved not only in diversity actions
before the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, but also before
federal district courts of about one hundred other districts.
In addition, actions in which federal jurisdiction is based on a federal
'The five questions certified involved the impact of the Montana Motor Vehicle Re-
sponsibility Law (REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 53-438) upon the terms of a
standard form of an automobile liability policy.
'Rule I was amended on January 31, 1967. This amendment adopted a unique pro-
cedure whereby state questions pending in a federal court might be answered by the
Montana Supreme Court under specified conditions.
'See, e.g., Fegles Const. Co. v. McLaughlin Const. Co., 205 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1953);
Stokes v. Reeves, 245 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1957); Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co.,
200 F.Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961); White v. Husky Oil Co., 266 F.Supp. 239 (D. Mont.
1967).
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question might sometimes raise questions of Montana law. For example, in
a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute on the ground that it
violates the Federal Constitution, questions of construction and application
of that statute are likely to be raised.4
Finally, issues of state law are often involved in bankruptcy proceed-
ings which raise questions concerning the validity or priority of claims,
the validity of security, or the ownership of property.5
In the above situations, the Rule of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins6 re-
quires a federal court to apply the pertinent state law. If a particular
question of local law has not been decided by the state supreme court, the
practioner often resorts to dicta from state court cases, Attorney General
opinions, or decisions from other jurisdictions in an attempt to ascertain
how the state supreme court would decide the question.
In a number of cases, 7 federal courts have applied the doctrine of
"abstention" and refused to speculate as to the posture of the applicable
state law. When this occurs the federal action is usually stayed or dis-
missed while the parties resort to state courts to secure a determination of
the ambiguous or unsettled questions of local law.8 This article will not
attempt to suggest the proper scope for this developing and somewhat
vaguely defined abstention doctrine.9 It is sufficient to recognize that
whenever ambiguous questions of state law arise in federal litigation,
there is a possibility that the federal court will abstain.
At the present time, it seems unlikely that Congress will abolish di-
versity jurisdiction or forbid the use of abstention. Questions of state law
will continue to arise in federal litigation. 10 Consequently, it is not surpris-
'See, e.g., Columbia Building & Loan Ass'n v. Grange, 77 F. 798 (C.C. Mont. 1896);
Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 32 F.Supp. 964 (D. Mont. 1940).
'See, e.g., Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940). UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODES § 9-108, comment 1, states: ''The determination of when a transfer
is for antecedent debt is largely left by the Bankruptcy Act to state law."
6304 U. S. 64 (1938).
7See e.g., B-W Acceptance Corporation v. Torgerson, 234 F.Supp. 214 (D. Mont. 1964);
White v. Husky Oil Company, 266 F.Supp. 239 (D. Mont. 1967).
8id. 234 F.Supp. at 217, 266 F.Supp. at 244.
'In White v. Husky Oil Company, supra note 7 at 241, a Montana federal district
court indicated: "No uniform rules have been enunciated by the courts for determin-
ing when this doctrine is applicable, and the commentators, as well as the courts,
are not incomplete agreement." On the abstention doctrine generally, see: Gowen &
Izler, Federal Court Abstention in Diversity of Citizenship Litigation, 43 TEXAS L.
REV. 194 (1964); Kurland, Toward a Co. Operative Judicial Federalism, 24 F.R.D.
481 (1959); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 815
(1959); Note, Judicial Abstention, from the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59
COLUM L. REV. 749 (1959); Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1358 (1960) ; Note, Federal Abstention and Its Relation to the Erie
Doctrine, 38 TEMP. L. Q. 72 (1964); Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism,
108 U. PA. L. REV. 226 (1959); Note, The Abstention Doctrine: A Problem of Fed-
eralism, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1246 (1964) ; Note, Abstention and Certification in Diver-
sity Suit: "Perfection of Means and Confusion of Goals," 73 YALE L. J. 850 (1964).
"Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida
Supreme Court and its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 MIAMI L. R. 413, 433
(1962).
[Vol. 29
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ing that attorneys and judges alike have been seeking procedures for rap-
idly and equitably adjudicating state law issues when a federal court re-
mits the parties to state court for that purpose.
Prior to the adoption of the Montana Rule, three states had enacted
a procedure by which federal courts could certify pertinent and unsettled
questions of state law directly to the state supreme court.1' In January
of 1967, the following amendment to the Rules of the Montana Supreme
Court was adopted:
Whenever in an action pending in a United States court it shall
appear that there is a controlling question of Montana law as to
which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, a
party to such action may institute suit in the Montana Supreme
Court for a declaratory judgment or decree, and, if the judge
of the United States court wherein the action is pending shall
certify that the question upon which adjudication is sought is
controlling in the federal litigation and the adjudication by the
Montana Supreme Court will materially advance ultimate termina-
tion of the federal litigation, a declaratory judgment or decree may
be rendered. Rendition of the declaratory judgment or decree is
discretionary with the Montana Supreme Court, and it may refuse
to render such a judgment or decree if it appears that there is
another ground for determination of the case pending in the United
States court, or if the question for adjudication is not clearly briefed
or argued.
The Montana Rule should be distinguished from "certification"
procedures utilized in other states. Under the Florida certification rule,' 2
the state supreme court does not acquire jurisdiction to decide a contro-
versy previously before the federal court. The decision of the state su-
preme court has no res judicata or stare decisis effect. Only an "ad-
visory opinion" is rendered to the federal judiciary. 13 The Second Tenta-
tive Draft of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Rule seems
to contemplate a procedure similar to that employed in Florida.14
"Under the Florida and Hawaii procedures, questions can be certified only from a
federal appellate court. Under the Maine rule, any federal court may certify questions
to the state supreme court. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966), p. 109.
"FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1961). Pursuant to this statute, the Florida Supreme Court
adopted FLA. APPELLATE RULE 4.61 (1961). The Florida Rule states in part: ''When
it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States, or to any of the Court of
Appeal of the United States that there are involved in any proceeding before it
questions or propositions of law of this State which are determinative of said cause
and that there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme
Court of this State, such federal appellate court may certify such questions or propo-
sitions of law of this State to the Supreme Court of Florida for instructions concern-
ing such questions or propositions of state law." FLA. APP. R. 4.61(a)
"Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida
Supreme Court and its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 MIAMI L. REV. 413, 432.
WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL COURTS, 176 (1963).
4Section 1 of the proposed Uniform Rule states: "The Supreme Court may answer
questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of
Appeals of the United States, a United States District Court in this State, or the
highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate court of any other state, when
requested by the certifying court if there is involved in any proceeding before it a
question of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending
in the certifying court and as to which there is no controlling precedent in the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of this State." UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS
OF LAW RULE (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1967) p. 1.
1968]
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On its face, the express language of the Maine Rule ostensibly in-
corporates a "certification" procedure resembling that of Florida's and
the Uniform Rule. 15 The Maine Rule, however, has been construed as
contemplating a declaratory judgment as distinguished from an advisory
opinion. As the Supreme Judicial Court announced:
We are satisfied that more will be involved than the mere rendering
of a purely advisory opinion .... Parties are before the court and
are provided with the opportunity for presentation of briefs and
oral argument customary upon appeal. The certification will make
it apparent that there is a genuine live controversy between the
parties pending in the federal court, a controversy based upon an
existing factual situation which will be determined by ouir response
to questions. Such response will be in the nature of a declaratory
judgment. This court will treat the judgment which it renders on
legal issues tendered in certification proceedings as having the force
of decided case law within the courts of this state and as constituting
res adjudicata as between the same parties in any subsequent action
brought in our courts.16
Apparently, the Maine Rule was interpreted as calling for a declara-
tory judgment to insure that participation in the procedure by the Su-
preme Judicial Court would constitute a constitutional exercise of ju-
dicial power.' 7 The express "declaratory judgment" language of the
Montana Rule corresponds rather closely to the interpretation given the
Maine Rule. As indicated below, this express language in the Montana
Rule was probably adopted in an attempt to satisfy constitutional re-
quirements.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RULE I
It is probable that the constitutionality of the Montana Rule will be
challenged. To be upheld, the Rule I procedure must satisfy both federal
and state constitutional mandates. On the federal level, it might be argued
that Rule I violates the U.S. Constitution by permitting federal courts
to delegate judicial power to a body other than a court established under
article 11."' Moreover, Rule I must not violate federal justiciability
requirements. In this regard, it is established that the U.S. Constitution
T The Maine Rule provides in pertinent part: ''When it shall appear to the Supreme
Court of the United States, or to any court of appeals or district court of the United
States, that there are involved in any proceeding before it one or more questions of
law of this State, which may be determinative of the cause, and there are no clear
controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court, such federal
court may certify any such question of law of -this State to the Supreme Judicial
Court for instructions concerning such questions of state law, which certificate the
Supreme Judicial Court sitting as a law court may, by written opinion, answer." 4
M.R.S.A. See. 57.
"In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 832 (Me., 1966).
17Ibid.
18The federal judicial power may not be extended beyond the grant of article III of
the Constitution. Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U. S. 428 (1923). It might
be suggested that this postulate has been undermined by O'Donoghue v. United
States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933) (courts of the District of Columbia held to be con-
stituted under article III) and by National Mat. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
337 U. S. 582 (1949) (diversity jurisdiction held to include litigation between
citizens of a state and a citizen of the District of Columbia).
[Vol. 29
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restricts federal judicial power to cases and controversies. 19 A justiciable
case or controversy must be one that is definite and concrete, touching
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be on a hypothetical state
of facts.20 In short, a federal court may not constitutionally render an
advisory opinion because such would violate justiciability requirements. 21
Consequently, if Rule I contemplates a mere advisory opinion, it would
be arguably unconstitutional for a federal court to incorporate such opinion
into a final adjudication of the parties' rights.
On the state level, justiciability requirements must also be satisfied.
Although eleven states permit advisory opinions, 22 Montana has adopted
the federal court position and held that the cases and controversies before
the Supreme Court must be "real controversies" and not mere requests
for advisory opinions.23
It would be difficult to convincingly argue, however, that Rule I
contemplates an advisory opinion and thus violates state and federal
justiciability requirements. An advisory opinion is one which lacks re-
sponsiveness to particular parties and does not directly affect the parties'
rights because it is unessential to the disposition of the case. Thus, an ad-
visory opinion is neither binding upon the parties nor determinative of
an actual dispute. 24 The Montana Rule expressly requires that a "party
to such action" institute the suit for a declaratory judgment in the state
Supreme Court. This provision insures a genuine controversy between
adverse parties. Furthermore, the state court decision under Rule I would
be responsive to a precisely posed question presented in actual litigation.
In addition, the decision of the Montana Supreme Court will constitute
an actual judgment having res judicata and stare decisis effect when the
parties return to federal court. Although the "case or controversy" prin-
ciple requires an adversary-type presentation of the relevant issues in
dispute, the Rule satisfies this requirement by providing that the Supreme
Court may refuse to render a judgment if "the question is not adequately
briefed or argued."
Article VIII, section 2 of the Montana Constitution provides that the
Supreme Court "shall have appellate jurisdiction only." Article VIII,
section 3 indicates that this appellate jurisdiction "shall extend to all
cases at law and in equity" and that the Supreme Court shall have dis-
cretionary power to determine such "original and remedial writs as may
"Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U. S. 237 (1952); Glidden' Co.
v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530 (1962) ; Muskrat v. U. S., 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
"Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., v. Haworth, 300 .S. 227, 240 (1937).
nWRIOHT, THE FEDERAL COURTS § 12, at 34 (1963). See, e.g., McGrath v. Kristensen,
340 U. S. 162 (1950); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911).
"Note, 40 TEXAS L. REv. 1041, 1045 (1962); Stevens, Advisory Opinions-Present
Status and an Evaluation, 34 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1959).
"MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; Chovanak v. Matthews, 120 Mont. 520, 525-26; 188 P.2d
582, 584 (1948).
"4HART AND WESCHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 77-79 (1953).
1968]
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be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdic-
tion." It can certainly be argued that the Rule I procedure is unconsti-
tutional because it is not in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the Mon-
tana Supreme Court and is not otherwise within its jurisdiction. A con-
stitutional basis for the Rule, however, might be grounded upon an analogy
to the apparent original jurisdiction of the Montana Supreme Court under
the Declaratory Judgment Act. 25 The Supreme Court has held that where
the importance and urgency of questions presented in a proceeding under
that Act are apparent, the Supreme Court may accept original jurisdiction
as "necessary and proper" to the complete exercise of its appellate juris-
diction. 26 Rule I, however, goes a step beyond holdings under the Declara-
tory Judgment Act in that it contemplates the acceptance of original
jurisdiction from a United States court over which the Montana Supreme
Court has no appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, it might be sug-
gested that the Supreme Court will accept original jurisdiction under
Rule I to avoid the necessity of determining a particular question in future
state court litigation.
It appears doubtful that decisions upholding the constitutionality of
certification procedures in other states represent sound precedent in Mon-
tana. The Supreme Court of Florida, for example, sustained their certifica-
tion rule on the basis that the Florida constitution does not restrict the
powers of its Supreme Court.27 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in
upholding the constitiQnality of their certification procedure, also im-
plied that the Maine Constitution does not limit the jurisdiction of their
state Supreme Court. 28 Neither Florida nor Maine has the problem of a
limiting constitutional provision such as Article VIII, section 2 of the
Montana Constitution. Moreover, it is at least arguable that the entirety
of the Montana Constitution is a grant, rather than a limitation, of state
power.
29
Some of the "reasoning" in support of the constitutionality of Rule
I is rather conjectural. In the final analysis, however, the Supreme Court
would probably sustain the Rule's constitutionality on the basis of its
holdings that it has original jurisdiction in certain declaratory judg-
ment actions. As a practical consideration, it seems highly unlikely that
the present Supreme Court will declare its own rule unconstitutional.
EREvISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-8901.
"Gullickson v. Mitchell, 113 Mont. 359, 364, 126 P.2d 1106 (1942); State ex. rel.
Schultz-Lindsay v. Bd. of Equalization, 145 Mont. 380, 402-403, 403 P.2d 635 (1965).
17The Florida court announced: " (T)here is no constitutional provision which either
expresses or implies that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida is limited
to express grants of power conferred upon it by the constitution . . . " Sun Ins.
Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735, 742-3 (Fla. 1961).
'Supra note 16. Article VI, section 1 of the Maine Constitution states: 'The judicial
power of this state shall be vested in a Supreme Judicial Court, and such other
courts as the Legislature shall from time to time establish." Section 3 provides:
''The justices of the Supreme Judicial Court shall be obliged to give their opinion
upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions, when required by the
Governor, Senate or House of Representatives.''
mNote, What is the Nature of the Montana Constitution? 15 MONT. L. REv. 93 (1954).
[Vol. 29
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UTILIZATION OF THE RULE
Rule I may be invoked in a federal court proceeding "whenever" it
appears there is a "controlling question" of Montana law if the other
requisites are also satisfied. It is conceivable, therefore, that the Rule
could be properly employed at any stage of a federal court proceeding
where a decisive ruling, order, motion, objection or instruction is predi-
cated on ambiguous local law. It is possible, for example, that motions
to dismiss, for a separate trial, for a directed verdict, or for a summary
judgment might involve controlling questions of Montana law. In ad-
dition, objections to evidence or to jury instructions could present an op-
portunity to utilize the new procedure.
The Rule makes it clear, however, that before the procedure is to
be employed, it must appear that:
1. the question is one of Montana law,
2. this question is controlling in the federal litigation,
3. there is substantial ground for difference of opinion as to the
resolution of the question,
4. the adjudication by the Montana Supreme Court will materially
advance ultimate termination of the federal litigation.
It is instructive to recognize that the language of Rule I resembles
that of 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) involving interlocutory decisions and appeals."
Thus, an analysis of cases decided under that section should be helpful
to counsel when determining what requisites are essential before the pro-
cedure in Rule I can be employed.
Section 1292 (b) was intended primarily as a means of expediting
litigation by permitting an authoritative determination, during the early
stages of litigation, of legal questions which, if decided in favor of one
party, would end the lawsuit.3 l It has been held, however, that the questions
brought on interlocutory appeal need not be dispositive of the lawsuit
in order to be regarded as "controlling. ''32 On the other hand, the fact
that the case involves an important legal question is insufficient to justify
application of the provision.33 In addition, the mere fact that there are
no cases interpreting the language of a statute does not necessarily create
"substantial ground for difference of opinion," as would justify an in-
terlocutory appeal under 1292(b) .34 The phrase "substantial ground for
'Section 1292(b) provides that: "When a district judge, in making in a civil action
an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that
such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in
writing such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit
an appeal to be taken from such order . . . "
1'U. S. v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1959).
"2Ibid.
1Bobolakis v. Compania Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo, 168 F.Supp. 236
(D.C.N.Y. 1958).
3
'Barrett v. Burt, 250 F.Supp. 904 (D. 0. Iowa 1966).
1968]
7
Eck: Recent Decisions
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1967
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
difference of opinion" in the federal rule has been interpreted as synony-
mous with "substantial likelihood that the appellant's position will pre-
vail." '35 In short, the provisions of section 1292(b), and presumably the
provisions of Rule I, are to be used only in extraordinary cases where the
decision might avoid protracted and expensive litigation, not merely to
provide a means of adjudicating difficult issues in hard cases.36 In ap-
plying the standards of Rule I it would seem desirable that the courts in-
volved weigh the asserted need for immediate authoritative determination
of the proposed questions against the established policy of discouraging
piecemeal litigation.37
At the present time, the precise interpretation and permissible utiliza-
tion of the Montana Rule remain uncertain. Whether the Montana court
will regard decisions under section 1292(b) as authoritative is equally
problematical. One difficulty, however, will most certainly confront many
attorneys seeking to invoke this new procedure: the question must be
certified to the Montana Supreme Court in the context of a satisfactory
factual setting. Consequently, a party wishing to avail himself of the Rule
should make his factual record in the federal court proceeding. This is
essential for several reasons. Constitutionally, the Montana Supreme Court
could not properly adjudicate a question in the absence of a suitable fac-
tual setting. Such decision would be merely "advisory" or "abstract"
in nature.3 8 In addition, a statement of the fundamental facts on which
the question of law arises is essential if a party is to adequately demon-
strate that the question in dispute is "controlling," and that its adjudi-
cation by the Montana Supreme Court would "materially advance ulti-
mate termination of the federal litigation.' 39 Moreover, to require the
state court to make its own findings of fact would not only fail to preserve
the quality of federal fact finding but would also do violence to the theory
that the Rule affords a speedy and inexpensive method of resolving un-
settled questions of state law.
The necessity of posing a disputed legal question in the context of
facts found by the fedgral court will undoubtedly cause practical diffi-
culty. This problem could become especially acute in a jury trial, when
a party seeks to utilize Rule I to adjudicate an interlocutory ruling or
order. At this intermediate stage of the trial, no facts have yet been found
by the jury. Perhaps the disputed order or ruling, however, could be
submitted to the Montana Supreme Court on an agreed statement of
facts.40
Insuring a satisfactory factual setting for the questions to be certi-
35Seven-Up Co. v. O-So Grape Co. 179 F.Supp. 167 (D. C. Ill. 1959).
-U. S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1966).
17In re Heddendorf, 263 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1959).
"See supra note 23 and 29.
"It appears Rule I makes this demonstration essential as a condition precedent to
invoking the procedure.
1'See infra notes 42 and 44.
[Vol. 29
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fied could also cause practical difficulty if the federal court abstains at
the outset of the litigation before any findings of fact have been made.
4 1
This common federal court practice is certainly not prohibited by the new
Montana Rule. In the instant case, it was fortunate that the parties
commenced suit in federal court on an agreed statement of facts.
42 It will
be consequently possible for the questions to be adjudicated by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court in a concrete factual setting. In the case of In re
Richards,43 however, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine refused to
answer questions certified from a federal court because the facts were
unsettled and the court's decision as to the applicable Maine law would
not be determinative of the cause. As the court indicated:
... the record is not yet in proper posture for our consideration ..
the facts have been neither agreed upon nor found, by the court. Al-
though the certification contains a "statement of facts" showing
"the nature of the case and the circumstances out of which such
questions of law of the State of Maine arise," this "statement" is
not and does not purport to be the definitive finding by the court
as to what the facts are.44
The problem of providing the Montana Supreme Court with a
definitive factual contex for questions certified under Rule I is prob-
ably not insurmountable. Because abstention itself represents a federal
court deference to state political authority, there is reason to believe that
those federal judges inclined to abstain would be willing to retain a case
until the findings of fact necessary to invoke Rule I have been made.
In addition to findings of fact, the federal judge's certificate might well
include as much of the record as is necessary for a complete understanding
of the questions to be answered in the declaratory judgment action.
Perhaps the greatest drawback to the abstention doctrine has been
the resulting delay.45 In some states, the parties would have to bring a
declaratory judgment action in a lower state court having original juris-
diction and work their way up to the highest court.46 Even before the
adoption of Rule I, however, litigants could have theoretically petitioned
directly to the Supreme Court of Montana for such a declaratory judg-
ment.47 Although the acceptance of original jurisdiction by the Montana
41Not only do federal courts often abstain at the outset of the litigation, but sometimes
they do so on their own motion. See e.g., White v. Husky Oil Company, 266 F.Supp.
239 (D. Mont. 1967); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25
(1959).
"Instant case at 859.
"3Supra note 16.
"Id. at 833.
"'See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101 (1944). In situations
where identical suits are pending in both state and federal court, however, abstention
would not involve any shunting of litigants from federal to state court which would
expose them to significant expense or delay. White v. Husky Oil Company, supra
note 41 at 244.
"Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the Florida
Supreme Court and its Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 MIAMi L. REv. 413, 424
(1962).
'
7See supra note 26.
1968]
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Supreme Court would have been entirely discretionary, it remains so under
the new Rule. While Rule I undoubtedly represents an official manifesta-
tion of the Montana Supreme Court's willingness to clarify ambiguous
state law under specified conditions, it is at least arguable that the new
procedure will do little to reduce the delay resulting from federal court
abstention.48 It could have been stated in the Rule that the procedure
was to be employed only when it would not cause undue delay in the
disposition of a case. This is a restriction, however, seemingly implicit in
the discretion of the federal and state courts as to when the Rule is to be
utilized.
If Rule I does afford a speedier method of ascertaining state law,
the very existence of that Rule might be a significant factor influencing
a federal court's decision to abstain in order that the new procedure can
be employed.49  In short, the declaratory judgment procedure could
conceivably become another, more pervasive, form of federal court ab-
stention. With the acquiesence of the parties to the federal action and the
federal judge, numerous questions might be certified to the state court
even though the federal court would not have abstained prior to the adop-
tion of Rule I. Although it might seem that Rule I could generate a
prohibitive increase in the docket load of the Montana Supreme Court,
this is highly unlikely in view of the discretion vested in that court to
either accept or reject jurisdiction.
Even assuming Rule I proves workable and efficient, its utilization
in diversity cases might be undesirable. On a theoretical level, the new
procedure is a device for according respect to state legislative and ju-
dicial authority. Federal diversity jurisdiction, on the other hand, is a
product of distrust of state judicial systems when out of state litigants
are involved.5 0 Consequently, it is arguable that the new declaratory judg-
"The Florida certification statute has apparently done little to solve the problem of
delay. There was a four year delay, for example, between the time that the Supreme
Court ordered certification of a question of state law to the Florida Supreme Court
in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 363 U. S. 207 (1960), and the final termination
of the case in light of the Florida answers, Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 377
U.S. 179 (1964). In addition, there was a delay of over 18 months between the
certification order in Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 85-86 (5th Cir.
1962), and the disposition of the case required in the light of the Florida answers in
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963). Perhaps justice and
economy are better served by having a prompt federal court answer to the state law
question than by having the theoretically more perfect state court answer. As was
stated in the dissenting opinion of Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 363 U. S. 207,
228 (1960): "The pursuit of justice is not an academic exercise. There are no
foundations to finance the resolution of nice state law questions involved in federal
court litigation.''
"Such a possibility was suggested by Justice Frankfurter in connection With the
Florida certification procedure. Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 363 U. S. 207,
212 (1960).
"This traditional explanation for the creation of diversity jurisdiction might still be a
danger. See, Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of
Citizenship, 78 U.PA. L. REV. 179 (1929); Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal
Courts, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 407 (1956). In a society considerably more mobile than
that of 1789, however, it is difficult to comprehend how prejudice against a litigant,
merely because he is a citizen of a different state, is a significant factor.
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ment procedure and federal diversity jurisdiction rest on diametrically
opposed policies. The conclusion might be drawn, therefore, that applica-
tion of Rule I negates the policy basis for diversity jurisdiction. Because
the federal court will presumably find the relevant facts before Rule I
is employed, the above conclusion rests on a questionable assumption that
the state court will express its bias in formulating a substantive rule of
law unfavorable to an out of state litigant. If that assumption be granted,
however, it might be cogently argued that state court bias against out of
state litigants can most easily find expression in those cases wherein
there is "substantial ground for difference of opinion" as to the posture
of Montana law. Because the new procedure can be employed only in
such cases, a conclusion that application of Rule I largely repudiates the
rational supporting diversity jurisdiction might be tenable.
It might be further suggested that Erie lends little support for the
use of Rule I since the Erie rule requires only that the federal courts not
create a federal common law and recognizes a federal court duty to de-
cide the case before it.51 It has been held that this federal court duty
to decide obtains no matter how vague or ambiguous the state law might
be. It exists even though the state courts have never adjudicated the
question involved.
52
It can be convincingly argued, however, that the advantages of
Rule I outweigh possible disadvantages. The new procedure certainly
saves federal judges from being placed in the unfortunate position of
having to make a prediction concerning the probable status of Montana
law which could subsequently be proved wrong by the Montana Supreme
Court. 53 Rule I will permit the parties to obtain an authoritative an-
swer to ambiguous questions of state law.5 4 At the same time, questions
of fact and issues of federal law can be adjudicated in federal court.
Thus, the new Montana Rule achieves the objectives of abstention by pre-
-Supra note 6.
5Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472 (1949); Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S.
701 (1949); Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U. S. 549 (1946); Markham v.
Allen 326 U. S 490 (1946) ; Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943) ; Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U. S (6 Wheat) 264 (1821).
"For several recent predictions by the Federal District Court for the District of Mon-
tana which could subsequently be proved erroneous by the Supreme Court of Mon-
tant, see, e.g., Howard v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth, 193 F.Supp. 191 (D.
Mont. 1961); Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 2P0 F.Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961);
Dutton v. Hightower & Lubrect Const. Co., 214 F.Supp. 298 (D. Mont. 1963); Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 232 F.Supp. 76 (D. Mont. 1964);
Bullard v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 263 F.Supp. 79 (D. Mont. 1967). The unfortunate
position of a federal court, when attempting to correctly ascertain an ambiguous
question of state law, is accentuated by a recent study revealing that there is " .
no underlying policy among the states to adopt the federal court 's construction of
state statutes or to adopt rulings on cases at common law simply because there was a
federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction. Whenever the proper case presented
itself in the state court and the state court felt compelled to construe the law differ-
ently from the federal court or to limit the application of the federal decision, this was
done.'' Note, The Effect of Diversity Jurisdiction on State Litigation, 40 IND.. L. J.
566, 584 (1962).
5
'Rule I will thus hopefully promote consistency of decisions between state and federal
1968]
11
Eck: Recent Decisions
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1967
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
venting federal invasion of the state legislative function and avoiding
unnecessary federal-state friction. In addition, the Rule represents a
more perfect attempt at cooperative judicial federalism since this con-
cern for state sovereignty is implemented through a hopefully efficient
and simple proceeding. Because the Rule contemplates that the declaratory
judgment action will be instituted directly in the Montana Supreme
Court, many of the delays incident to ordinary abstention orders can
probably be avoided. Since the new Rule cannot be invoked without the
concurrence of the federal court, the parties to the action, and the Mon-
tana Supreme Court, there is little danger it will be used except where
the issue of state law is crucial to the case and the state court determination
can be made without undue delay.55
CONCLUSION
The Montana Rule represents a unique experiment in cooperative
federalism. It should serve as an aid to the federal courts in discharging
their obligation under Erie to follow state law in diversity cases. While
the Rule presents some constitutional complexities and practical perplexi-
ties, most of the objections neglect the existing problems of "absention"
and of authoritatively determining state law in federal litigation. The
new procedure represents a bold step forward in the solution of these
problems. It is presently difficult to ascertain the variety of situations
which may lend themselves to the Rule's application. To a large extent,
this will be determined by the ingenuity of counsel and the cooperation
of the federal and Montana courts.
LAURENCE E. ECK
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW- FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
GIVE UNION THE RIGHT TO HIRE ATTORNEY ON SALARY TO REPRESENT
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CLAIMS OF MEMBERS. The Illinois court en-
joined the United Mine Workers of America from continuing a plan by
which the union hired an attorney on a salary to represent members and
their dependents in claims under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act.
The union agreed not to interfere with the attorney. Members submitted
forms to the attorney reporting the accident, and the full amount of any
settlement was paid directly to the member or his dependents. Held,
court. It might be noted, however, that if there is no Montana law on a point in
1968, there is little chance of an abundance of state cases on this point in the future.
"On the other hand, from the express language of Rule I an argument might be made
that after the certificate from the federal court has issued, the Montana Supreme
Court has no discretion to refuse rendering a judgment unless there is another
ground for determination of the case or if the question for adjudication is not clearly
briefed or argued.
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